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Abstract Cottee (Br J Criminol 54(6):981–1001, 2014) makes the case that criminology
has much to contribute to an understanding of theistic violence. However the ‘hubris of
positivism’ (Young in The criminological imagination, Polity, Cambridge, 2011) curtails
the criminological imagination and this is particularly evident in the debates that permeate
contemporary understandings of religious extremism and radicalisation. Using the terrorist
attacks in France 2015 as a touchstone, this paper explores the current state of crimino-
logical engagement with these issues. First a synopsis of orthodox current criminological
talk about religious extremism and violent crime is considered. Next a critical analysis of
the events in Paris based around what is ‘known’ about them is offered in the light of this
knowledge. Finally, drawing on the work of Young (2011) the implications of this analysis
for criminology are considered resulting in a refinement of the biases identified by Cottee
(2014).
Introduction
If the terrorist attacks in the United States in September 2001 marked a moment of
‘anthropological shock’ in the Western world (Beck 2015: 77), events in Paris in January
2015 served to reconfirm that 9/11 was more than simply a ‘transgressive moment’ (Jenks
2003). The Paris events attracted the media gaze for several days and unfolded in real time
across international broadcast networks. On January 7th two gunmen entered the Paris
offices of the French satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo, killing nine people inside those
offices and a police officer attending the incident. The perpetrators claimed that the attack
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was carried out to avenge the Prophet Mohammed for the magazine’s derogatory portrayal
of Islam and Muslims. The next day a policewoman was killed by a third gunman who, on
January 9th entered a kosher supermarket in Paris taking several people hostage. Four
people were killed inside the supermarket. The three gunmen were all eventually shot dead
by the French security services. The total death toll came to seventeen. A death toll
superceded in the attacks that took place in this same city in November 2015, which
claimed the lives of 133 people. Aside from re-igniting debates about the threat of ‘home-
grown terrorism’ in media, political, and security circles, both of these events have had a
profound effect in France and elsewhere. For some, the attacks in Paris may well have
constituted a ‘moral violation’ (Beck 2015: 77), leading to millions of people in January
2015 collectively rallying around the slogan ‘Je Suis Charlie’ (see Khan and Mythen
2015). For others, the focus on free speech at all costs and the intensification of surveil-
lance on Muslims which followed generated disquiet (see Fassin 2016). Thus, the hap-
penings in Paris raise a series of complex and knotty issues that stretch beyond concerns
about the execution of violence inspired by religious and political ideology. Extensive
media coverage of the events in January coupled to widespread discussion of the life
biographies of the perpetrators—which did not happen to the same extent in respect of the
November 2015 perpetrators—affords a unique opportunity to reflect on the contemporary
criminological response to events such as these.
In 2014 Cottee accused those working within criminology of three biases: the secular,
the religious and the liberal. He avers that a focus on the secular reflects a domain
assumption of the discipline and goes on to suggests that whilst this has resulted in work on
the crime prevention aspects of religion, there is much less concern with the crime
inducing aspects. For Cottee (2014) each of these biases constrain the criminological vision
and mute its capacity to make sense of theistic violence. Cottee (2014) suggests that it is
high time that we talked about such things. Of course, this might be taken to imply that
criminology and criminologists do not talk about such things. They do, and, to be fair,
Cottee acknowledges this. What is more prescient perhaps is that this talk tends to take a
particular shape and conforms to a particular agenda. Our objective here is to try and push
Cottee’s critique further and to reflect upon how it might be possible to engage in a
different and more productive conversation about religious extremism and its connection to
violence within criminology. In order to do this, the paper falls into three parts. First, we
offer a critical criminological analysis of the events in Paris in January 2015 based around
what is ‘known’ about them and available in the public domain. Second, we provide a
synopsis of orthodox current criminological thinking about religious extremism and violent
crime and seek to establish the fit between this and these events. Bringing these two
elements together provides a platform for developing a differently nuanced agenda for
thinking through the problem of religious extremism. Third, in the light of the preceding
discussion, we attempt to refine the biases identified by Cottee (2014).
Fractured Lives: Said Kouachi, Cherif Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly
In the light of the coverage given to the perpetrators of the January attacks, it is possible to
piece together aspects of the life histories of the three men involved: Said Kouachi, Cherif
Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly. Of course, it would be naı¨ve to presume that the moti-
vations for their actions can be deciphered from these secondary accounts, or even that
such accounts enable us to pinpoint, retrospectively, the defining moments in their life
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histories. Rather, the purpose here is to create loosely pixilated portraits of these three men
in order to reflect upon the potential efficacy of the available criminological approaches to
make sense of them. Thus, it is the patterns articulated in these young men’s lives that are
more pertinent to our argument, not the explicit veracity of the details.
Cherif and Said Kouachi were both born in Paris and were French nationals of Algerian
descent. Little is known about their father, but their mother died of a drugs overdose. The
two brothers are said to have returned home from School to find her, lying dead in their
apartment (Irish Times 2015). The elder brother by 2 years, Said’s life seems to have
provoked the least comment either in relation to his childhood or in terms of his rela-
tionship with his brother. Said was registered as unemployed and had been living with his
wife and two children in a two bedroomed apartment in a social housing tower block in the
Croix Rouge area of Reims, one of the poorest and rundown parts of the city. His
neighbours observed that he was a ‘quiet and private’ person, who wore traditional Muslim
clothes (Chrisafis 2015). He was the only one of the three perpetrators not to have spent
time in prison, although he had come to the attention of the police in 2005 as a result of an
investigation into a suspected radical Islamist group (Chrisafis 2015). Prior to 2005, he had
cohabited with his brother in the 19th arrondissement of Paris, but, unlike his brother, he
was not convicted on terrorism charges linked to the so called ‘Buttes-Chaumont cell’
(Chrisafis 2015). After the Paris attacks, the Yemeni authorities confirmed that Said was in
Yemen for a period of several months in 2011 and was suspected of having fought for al-
Qaida in the Yemen. He is thought to have been amongst a group of foreigners deported
from Yemen in 2012 (Chrisafis 2015). Both he and Cherif were on the US and UK security
intelligence no-fly lists (BBC News 2015).
Said’s brother, Cherif was born on 29th November 1982 in the 10th arrondissement of
Paris and, after his mother’s death, was raised in care homes in Brittany from the age of 12.
Much more seems to have been made public about the life of Cherif Kouachi than of his
brother. Cherif is said to have had a poor educational record, but went on to pursue a sports
qualification, later becoming a gym instructor (BBC News 2015). On moving back to Paris
in 1988 he lived in the 19th arrondissement to the north of the city and held a number of
low skilled, low paid jobs, latterly working as a pizza delivery driver. Documentary
footage of Cherif retrieved from a 2004 TV program shows him dancing to rap music
whilst wearing a backwards baseball cap. He claims in the documentary to have become
radicalized stating ‘It’s written in the texts that it’s good to die as a martyr’ (Chrisafis
2015). By 2005, Cherif had become involved in a group seeking to channel young Parisian
men to fight in Iraq. It became known as the Buttes-Chaumont cell named after the Park
where Kouachi and others met and exercised together (Chrisafis 2015). In 2005 he was
detained whilst attempting to board a flight bound for Syria—at that time the main gateway
for jihadists joining militants fighting US troops in Iraq—as part of the same investigation
that had brought Saif to the attention of the police. By this time he had reputedly come
under the influence of a radical preacher, Farid Benyettou. At the trial his lawyer presented
him as somewhat relieved to have been arrested claiming that he was simply looking for
excitement (Chrisafis 2015). At the end of his trial in 2008 the court sentenced him to
3 years which meant he was released immediately having already spent almost that much
time in prison on remand. After the case this lawyer is said to have told the media that he
had ‘found a kind of family, a cause in life’ (Chrisafis 2015). His time in prison was spent
in the largest prison in France, Fleury-Merogis on the outskirts of Paris, which at that time
had been subjected to public criticism about unhygienic conditions and over-crowding of
inmates (Alexander 2015). He met Amedi Coulibaly in Fleury-Merogis. On release from
prison, Cherif maintained a low profile, became married and took up employment in the
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fish section of a supermarket in Paris. In 2010 he was again arrested by police, this time as
part of an alleged plot to free Smaı¨n Aı¨t Ali Belkacem, an Algerian born Islamist, who had
been sentenced to life imprisonment in 2002 for his part in the bombings at the Musee
d’Orsay train station in Paris in October 1995. Having refused to respond to any questions
from the police he was subsequently released without charges.
Aged 32 years old, Amedy Coulibaly was born in Juvisy-sur-Orge on the outskirts of
Paris, his parents having migrated to France from Mali. The only boy in a family with nine
sisters, he grew up on a large housing estate, Le Grande-Borne, a neighbourhood of
Grigny, 14 miles south of Paris (Irish Times 2015). This estate was one of the trouble spots
of the ‘banlieues’ that flared up in 2005 and one routinely characterised in the media as a
centre for drugs and violent crime. Coulibaly was convicted twice for armed robbery. In
2000, when he was 18 years old, his closest friend, Ali Rezgui was shot dead by the police
while attempting to flee the scene of a robbery. The French courts subsequently rejected
requests by the victim’s family to review the circumstances of the death, ruling that the
officer acted in legitimate defence. Indeed, it was this decision not to review the incident
that is said to have triggered several days of rioting in Grigny and other banlieues on the
Southern outskirts of Paris (Meichtry 2015). After serving his first prison sentence for
armed robbery, he began dealing drugs and was convicted, serving another sentence. When
Coulibaly was serving his third prison sentence for armed robbery he and Cherif Kouachi
met in prison. Coulibaly was one of the inmates who had participated in campaigning
against the conditions in Fleury-Merogis. He and Cherif Kouachi not only became friends,
they found a mentor in Djamel Beghal, an associate of Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada. After
leaving prison, there is evidence to suggest that Coulibaly and Kouachi maintained contact
with Beghal, visiting him whilst he was under house arrest in rural France (BBC News
2015). In July 2009, Amedy Coulibaly married Hayat Boumeddiene in an Islamic cere-
mony conducted at the home of Mr. Coulibaly’s parents. As Boumeddiene was not present
at the wedding, the marriage was not recognized under French law (Meichtry 2015). Along
with Cherif Kouachi, Coulibaly was accused of being involved in a plot to free Smaı¨n Aı¨t
Ali Belkacem from prison in 2010 (Irish Times 2015). The case against Kouachi was
dropped, Coulibaly received a 5-year prison sentence, a police search having found AK-47
ammunition stored in a paint pot in his apartment. While serving his term in prison
Coulibaly received the news that his father was dying of cancer. He submitted a request for
temporary release to visit his father which was denied (Meichtry 2015). He was released in
2014, described as a model inmate (Chrisafis 2015), and resumed married life with Hayat
Boumeddiene. She left France for Syria a few days before the attacks in Paris and was in
close contact with Said Kouachi’s wife in the months prior to the attack. In a video made
before his final act, he claimed that his assault was justified as a reprisal for Western
attacks on Islamic State militants.
Although incomplete, partial and contingent on secondary sources, these accounts are
illustrative of the fractured lives referred to in the title of this paper. In many ways these
lives reflect different features of well-established knowledge within criminology
addressing routes into crime: alienation, exclusion, family size, poverty, disrupted
upbringings, pathways from home to care and from crime to prison, struggles within the
education system. All of these factors have been identified as ‘predictors’ of criminal
behaviour. Moreover, as Braithwaite (1989) pointed out some time ago, being young and
male is one of the major factors that any criminological theory needs to account for in
explaining crime. These young men, as we shall see, also grew up in areas classified and
policed as problem crime areas: socially deprived, suffering from high unemployment,
highly densely populated- housing largely immigrant populations. All of which point to the
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relevance of structural conditions. To what extent are these lives captured by contemporary
ways of thinking about routes into violent extremism within criminology?
Three French Men: Criminology and Violent Extremism
This is not the place to review all the available criminological work that has focused on the
relationship between religion and crime (see Akers 2010). Cottee (2014) argues that much
of this work has focused on the deterrent effects of religious belief on potential deviant
and/or criminal behaviour: a view tempered recently by Tivalli et al. (2013). However this
relationship is rendered more complex when religious belief is seen to encourage violent
action, particularly when such actions are deemed to be replete with transcendental
rewards (Routledge and Arndt 2008) and interpreted as separate and separable from the
contemporary context (Bielefeldt 2015). Against this general backcloth, and as Cottee
(2014) himself argues, understandings of the role of belief/religion per se in all its com-
plexity in promoting violent extremism have been decidedly muted. Nonetheless it is
possible to discern four main approaches to this issue: the ‘lone wolf’ approach, strain
theory, subcultural approaches, and those that take adopt a structural perspective. The
question remains, what might each of these approaches reveal to us about the three young
men that carried out the attacks in Paris in January 2015?
As the label implies, the ‘lone wolf’ approach looks to make sense of violent extremism
as it might be generated by the innate characteristics of the individual concerned. Much has
been made of the personality of Anders Breivik that fits well with this kind of under-
standing (see, inter alia, Billig and Stalne 2012). Gruenewald et al. (2013) have pointed to
the significance of mental instability/illness, military background, age, and relationship
status as distinguishing ‘loners’ from other kinds of extremists: a product of what they call
‘self-radicalisation’. In a similar vein, Bhui et al. (2014) report a link between mild
depression and expressed support for violence and tendencies towards radicalisation.
However, as Pape (2006) argues, it is important to remember that the vast majority of
suicide bombers also belong to, or are affiliated with, organizations making the attribution
of psychological factors alone difficult. Were these French men ‘lone wolves’?
Arguably, one of the three men, Coulibaly, was disposed toward the thrill of violence,
with a long history of injurious offences and identified as suffering psychological problems
in his youth. Coulibaly was first accused of robbery at the age of 15 and went on to develop a
criminal career that included shoplifting, drug-dealing, armed robbery and the sale of stolen
goods (Meichtry 2015). A psychiatric report on Coulibaly submitted as court evidence is
said to have found no evident pathology, but an ‘immature and psychopathic personality’,
with ‘poor powers of introspection’ and a desire to be ‘all powerful’ (BBC News 2015).
However, whatever weight is afforded to these observations neither he, nor Saif or Cherif
Kouachi can adequately be categorised as ‘lone wolves’. In terms of the role of religion in
contributing toward their actions, it is likely that Coulibaly and Cherif Kouachi became
more devout during their time in prison, although it remains an open question as to whether
or not this is where they became ‘radicalised’. Of course, the ‘lone wolf’ approach, in
focusing on innate characteristics or problem personalities, draws attention away from the
structural conditions in which these young men found themselves and the role of their
beliefs in seeking a way of managing those conditions. In Coulibaly’s case it seems rea-
sonable to suggest that his hatred of the French authorities was at least in part motivated by
the perceived injustices he, his family and his friends, had been subjected to.
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Those working with strain theory draw together psychological approaches with the
sociological. Agnew (2010) has recently developed this approach and applied it to routes
into violent extremism. He argues that ‘collective strains’ have a high impact on indi-
viduals, when they are seen to be unjust, and when they are seen to be the result of
powerful others ‘with whom the members of the strained collective have weak ties’
(Agnew 2010: 136). Under these conditions those individuals with a psychological
propensity for violent extremism will be particularly vulnerable to engaging in that kind of
action. Indeed, as is developed below, Cherif Kouachi, referred to himself as a ‘ghetto
Muslim’ in an earlier police interview, more than hinting at an awareness of his own
structural location and the strains inherent within it. Indeed, the vignettes of each of their
lives effectively illustrate the kinds of ‘strains’ they lived with. However, as Dalgaard-
Nielsen (2010: 801), and others have asked, why do some people react different with
violence as others not when all are exposed to the same conditions of strain? This rhetorical
question succinctly reminds us of the role of belief and the different ways in which belief
might be expressed. Put simply not all those who find themselves cast as ‘ghetto Muslims’
choose to show their allegiance to the Prophet in the dramatic way that these three young
men did.
The question posed by Dalgaard-Nielsen (2010) has led some to consider the relevance
of a variation of strain theory focusing in on the significance of sub-cultural values. Here
attention has been drawn to the ‘culture of violence thesis’ (see Mullins and Young 2012).
In this vein, Cottee (2011) considered the importance of both ‘sub-cultural style’ and
structure in understanding the commitment to Jihadism. This approach accents the
importance of social networks, personal bonds, and the construction of shared meanings
and understandings about the world. In so doing, it offers a valuable additional contextual
dimension to Sageman’s (2007) observation that individuals who join radical Islamist
groups committed to violence are already acquainted with an existing member of the
group. Moreover, the importance of networks in promoting and/or undermining violence
has also been noted in the context of what Hamm (2009) refers to as ‘prison Islam’. Here
again we can see aspects of this approach present in these young men’s lives. Their
experience in prison—developed below—is worth noting in particular, as are the prior
inter-connections between them leading up to the events in January 2015. Yet again
caution is advisable here. Subcultural processes do not exist in a vacuum. They cannot but
be formed in a structural context.
In structural explanations, social exclusion and disenfranchisement lead to the emer-
gence of extremist violent subcultures. Yet the question remains as to whether or not
violent extremism can be explained solely by the recourse to poverty, inequality and
exclusion. For example, Kreuger and Maleckova (2003) note, the vast majority of mate-
rially and geographically dispossessed Palestinians do not engage in political violence.
Similarly, the impoverished and persecuted Rohingya Muslims of Myanmar fled en masse
under persecution rather than responded with force. Moreover, the explanatory power of
structural perspectives is also thrown into doubt by the inchoate ‘profiles’ of perpetrators of
terrorist attacks. Aside from the obvious case of the Saudi millionaire who became the
leader of Al Qaeda, there are numerous examples of individuals from non-deprived
backgrounds engaging in violent extremism (see Post 2007), including Anders Breivik and
the so called ‘Hamburg cell’ who executed the 9/11 attacks. These examples suggest it is
erroneous to presume that material deprivation works in a simple and/or straightforward
manner in relation to the propensity to commit violence. Indeed, in terms of the three
young men under discussion here, whilst they all lived in relatively poor suburbs and had
experiences of deprivation in their early lives, those experiences were not all negative. One
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of them, Amedy Coulibaly, on release from prison in 2007 went on to work for Pepsi Cola
and was once received—along with nine other young guests—at the E´lyse´e Palace in 2009
by former president Nicolas Sarkozy at an event on youth employment (see Irish Times
2015; Meichtry 2015). Saif Kouachi was employed for a time by the City Hall in Paris as a
‘recycling ambassador’ (Beaud 2015)- illustrative of not only the limits of structural
explanations on their own but also the uneven nature of these young men’s lives.
To summarize; there are a number of different explanations available to criminologists
with which to make sense of what may motivate people to engage in violent extremism.
While we have, for analytical purposes, mapped them out as distinct, it may be prudent to
view them as potentially complementary. Nonetheless, it is certainly the case that they are
each concerned with different levels of analysis—from the individual, to the cultural to the
structural. Schmid (2013) uses a similarly layered analysis of available understandings of
radicalisation: the micro, the meso and the macro. Arguably, the criminological approaches
highlighted above address the micro and meso levels, but fail adequately to deal with the
macro. Whilst it is likely that a multi causal approach is appropriate, the four explanatory
strands discussed here share in common a muting of the role of religious belief. They also
erase the biographical experiences of perpetrators of violent extremism. The third feature
they share in common is a muting of the role of the State in both its domestic and
international actions (Schmid 2013). So, it is important not only to piece together a picture
of these young men’s lives but also to put those lives into a particular socio-cultural context
in order to dig a little deeper into making sense of their final acts of violence.
From ‘Ghetto Muslims’ to ‘Soldiers of the Caliphate’: Strangers Within?
It is clear that the range of life choices open to the three young men were both conditioned
and limited by ethnicity, class and circumstance. As noted above, when arrested as he
attempted to travel to Iraq, Cherif Kouachi referred to himself during a police interview as
a ‘ghetto Muslim’. The word ‘ghetto’, though considered derogatory in many international
contexts, is used in France as a coda for describing particularly deprived areas with large,
ethnic minority populations. All three perpetrators were born, grew up, and lived in such
areas. Understanding this feature of their lives sets the scene for appreciating how their
attitudes towards, and relationship with, the French State was framed.
In France, the frequency of police checks of young, ethnic minority males has provoked
similar frustrations to those voiced in Britain and elsewhere. As Camilleri (2012: 34) notes:
To explain why descendants of immigrants of Muslim origin have a distinct mistrust
for the police, it is necessary to take into account the frequency of contact these
people have with the police force, especially in the form of police identity checks.
Such identity checks have long been a source of controversy among young people
from working class backgrounds, especially those of immigrant origin. Indeed, a
2009 OSI study based on in situ observations of such identity checks in Paris
established that police controls often targeted young men that visibly belonged to
ethnic minorities and who adopted ‘‘youth’’ dress codes.
The ethnographic work of Fassin (2013), conducted during the disturbances in Paris and
elsewhere in 2005 and published in English in 2013, stands as testimony to the ordinary,
everyday, normalised nature of these checks and the types of attitudes and experiences that
accompany them for those so treated. In the context of the kind of criminal behaviour
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under discussion here, Body-Gendrot (2012: 90) adds that a range of criteria are used by
the security and intelligence services to designate an area a ‘sensitive zone’. These include
the density of the immigrant population, the presence of ethnic shops, non-Western and
religious ways of dressing and the presence of radical imams. She goes on to comment:
‘this is a quite a feat for a country that does not officially recognise ethnicity and denies
racial profiling’ (ibid). Thus young, ethnic minority males, particularly in sensitive zones,
live their lives under something of a microscope, being frequently asked to produce their
papers and to justify what they are doing and why. Such structural conditions are not just
about the intensification of surveillance and modes of policing, however.
Hedges (2015), reflecting on spending time in the housing projects (the ‘banlieues’)
states:
There is little employment in these pockets of squalor. Racism is overt. Despair is
rampant, especially for men, who feel they have no purpose. Harassment of immi-
grants, usually done by the police during identity checks, is almost constant …
French Muslims make up 60 to 70 per cent of the prison population in France. Drugs
and alcohol beckon like sirens to blunt the pain of poor Muslim communities. The 5
million North Africans in France are not considered French by the French.
Herein lie some deeper clues to the kinds of currents affecting the lives of Coulibaily and
the Kouachi brothers. Historically, having an address from one of the banlieues constituted
an automatic disqualification for some employers in the job application process (Murray
2006). Further, as Body-Gendrot (2010: 657) observes, a lack of commitment by policy-
makers and the police alike to these neighbourhoods in terms of developing responsive
infrastructures and effective service delivery is an important factor in understanding the
conditions in the banlieues. She also reports that unemployment rates in some areas peak as
high as 64 % for juveniles and immigrants (based on 2008 figures, ibid: 659) and poverty
rates are three times higher in these areas than the national average. Thus, it is easy to see
how routes into criminality become not some much possible avenues, but routine roads
taken. Then there is prison.
The general conditions and standards in French prisons fall short of being acceptable on
a number of counts. In addition to the high proportion of inmates that identify as Muslim—
Hedges (2015) suggests 60–70 %—reports of older prisons being dilapidated and suffering
from infestation are evident from European Prison Observatory Reports (see Cretenot and
Liaros 2013). Khrosrokhavar (2013) reports that overcrowding, understaffing, and a high
staff turnover have all contributed to the qualitative increase in radicalisation in prison. The
small number of prison Imams as compared with Catholic chaplains is also a source of
grievance for Muslim prisoners. These conditions—taken together with a variation in
institutional interpretations about access to special diets and so forth—add to an institu-
tional denial as to the nature of the French prison population and its needs/rights. In a
detailed and nuanced study of radicalisation in prison from the perspective of the prisoners
themselves, Khrosrokhavar (2013) contends that whilst the heavy surveillance and
supervision practiced in French prisons has prohibited the growth of large, enduring radical
Muslim networks in prison, the restrictions on religious practices taken along with other
poor services simultaneously facilitates the formation of smaller, more tightly bonded
groups. Lying behind some of these issues is the commitment of the French State to
‘laicite’: secularity.
Under these conditions the possibility of suffering what Spalek (2006) poignantly refers
to as ‘spirit injury’ is tangible; as is the quest to heal such wounds with dramatic and
violent reprisal. Indeed, the respective journeys of the Paris trio into violent extremism
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share many parallels with that of Mohammed Merah, a French national of Algerian des-
cent, who shot and killed seven people in Montauban and Toulouse in March 2012. In a
detailed biographical account of Merah’s life, Andre and Harris-Hogan (2013) document
his transition from juvenile delinquent, through to radicalisation in prison, to calling
himself a ‘Knight of Glory’—a radical Salafist group established in France in 2010—just
before he was shot after being under siege from the police. He, like Saif and Cherif
Kouachi and Amedy Coulibaly, found a place and identity at the moment of death through
the rewards engendered possible by their religious belief (see also Wiktorowicz 2005).
Fassin (2011) might add to this that through the violence they inflicted on others it is
possible to trace the violences of the State.
The cumulative effect of documenting the lives of the Paris perpetrators in this way
adds some weight to the view that they were strangers in their own country. Not considered
French even by the French: strangers within. This liminal life in which immigrants traverse
the world, sometimes without papers and sometimes with, bears the traces of French
colonial history. As one of the authors of this paper was categorically informed by a French
colleague ‘our Muslims are not your Muslims’. This may be the case, but through religion
‘different Muslims’ are spiritually connected by ummatic attachments. As Hedges (2015)
observes, the failure to connect the events in Paris with the military conflict engagement—
then disengagement—of the West in Iraq and Afghanistan has fuelled anger. This is an
anger that is, of course, intrinsically connected with collective despair and poverty—the
‘sprit injury’- but it is also an anger that the events in Paris and elsewhere suggest is
dangerous to ignore. Moreover in France, the liminality of these lives and the feelings so
generated have been afforded an added dimension over the last decade through renewed
French commitment to ‘laı¨cite´’: secularity.
La Republique, Violent Extremism and Criminology: Knowing the Lives
of Others?
Estimating the shape and size of the ethnic minority population in France and its religious
composition is difficult, since the collection of such personal data is prohibited. This is one
of the consequences of the French commitment to secularity, itself a product of infamous
periods of religious and sectarian violence. However, estimates suggest that Islam con-
stitutes the second largest religious faith in France standing at around 10 % (Camilleri
2012). The concept of ‘laı¨cite´’ was enshrined in French law in 1905, through what is
commonly referred to as the Law of Separation. When formulated, the intention of this
Law was to ensure that the State and its institutions were free from religious domination or
bias. Through this law, religion was deemed a matter of conscience and at the time of its
formulation the focus of concern was to ensure freedom for Jewish and Protestant
minorities. This separation of church and State, Andre and Harris-Hogan (2013) suggest,
has had unintended consequences. In confining religion as a private matter, one of the side
effects has been that the State has potentially accumulated greater not lesser coercive
power over individuals. In the last decade in particular—a period in which all of the young
men discussed above were growing up, a ‘hard’ version of ‘laı¨cite´’ has emerged and one
that appears to have impacted on some faith communities more than others. Deep concerns
over the wearing of headscarves emerged in the late 1980s were followed by the ‘debate’
about the wearing of the hijab in schools. The prohibition of both of these practices has
marked France out as an outlier in comparison to other European nations. As Barras (2013:
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227), suggests ‘laı¨cite’ has therefore been mobilized over the last decade as a resource to
address this presence (of Muslim minority groups) and justify an increasingly non-ac-
commodating stance vis-a-vis demands made by French Muslims in different spaces’.
Arguably the hardening of laı¨cite´ in France has taken its toll predominantly on Muslim
women, constituting a visible trace of the increasing surveillance and control over Muslim
minority lives. Whether male or female, the question of being French and yet not being
considered ‘French’ at all has had real consequences and caused schisms and dilemmas for
those whose identities are stigmatised and problematized.
It is important to contextualise this hardening of secularity with reference to dominant
values and attitudes. Eurobarometer reports for 2004 as compared with 2014 indicate that,
in 2004 French people thought that the three biggest problems in France were unem-
ployment (51 %), crime (27 %), and the economic situation (24 %). However, by 2014
public perceptions of the three biggest social problems had changed to unemployment
(63 %), the economic situation (26 %) and immigration (11 %). The rise in public con-
cerns about ‘immigration’ is likely to be connected to the observations regarding a cultural
and religious crunch made by Andre and Harris-Hogan (2013: 317):
The increasing multi-cultural transformation of French society through the influx of
non-Christian immigrants who remain attached to their religious rites are in conflict
with the customs of Republic life and often do not feel at home in the laı¨cite´’s radical
separation between private and public spheres.
In their view, this leaves the socially excluded in France, minority Muslim communities
susceptible to extremism. They go on to suggest that for Merah—the subject of their case
study—this wider context only served to harden his search for a firm identity through
religion. The greater intrusion into the private realm permitted by the French commitment
to the secular frames some of the problematic features associated with experiences of the
criminal justice process. This is particularly the case for those Muslims in prison whose
liminal existence in wider French society can be exacerbated through lack of recognition of
religious belief in that setting. Commenting on the de-territorialised, global features of
Islam that cuts across cultures, Andre and Harris-Hogan (2013: 319) suggest that the
challenge for France is to ‘promote a genuinely liberal understanding of its neutrality with
respect to religious diversity’. Of interest here is their reference to what might count as
‘liberal’ and it is to that issue and its relationship to the production of criminological
knowledge that we shall now turn.
Hopefully the use of the vignettes has illustrated that there are points of resonance
between contemporary criminological approaches to violent extremism and the stories with
which we have been working. However, returning to our starting point, Cottee (2014: 985)
posited that the liberal bias of criminology ‘reflects a liberal uneasiness on their part
[criminologists] about the current public debate on religion and the highly political and
politicised form it has taken’. So whilst there has been considerable concern about the
demonization of religious minorities emanating primarily from those on the ‘left’ of the
discipline, it should be noted that there has been at least equal energy concerned to make
sense of violent extremism by those committed to a more conventional criminological
conceptual agenda. Arguably there is more work to be done from within this agenda
through the lens of life course criminology and/or the application of ‘turning points’
(Sampson and Laub 1993). Indeed, we agree with Cottee (2014) on the need for crimi-
nology to pay more attention to theistic violence. However how criminology might proceed
to do that demands a more thorough appreciation and critique of the liberal bias within the
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discipline. One place from which to develop such a critique might be to reflect upon that
which Young (2011) has called the ‘bogus of positivism’.
Young’s (2011: 80) critique of positivism is largely directed at the dominance of
American criminology on the wider nature and form of the discipline which results in a
tangible contradiction, namely that ‘the most influential work in criminology stems from
one of the most atypical advanced industrial societies’. Notwithstanding interpretations of
‘influential’, buried in this contradiction is a projection of American (liberal) values par-
ticularly concerning individualism on the discipline as a whole. This embrace of positivism
embeds those liberal values within criminology and produces a ‘nomothetic impulse (ibid.
79) that implies a ‘denial of specificity’ (ibid. 77). This vision of knowledge and its
production process denies culture, and facilitates the comfortable and comforting liberal
analyses of ‘the Other’. While such ways of thinking, ‘represents something of a defence
against the insecurities of the modern world’ (Young 2011: 69) in which we are all
implicated. Young (2011) is keen to indicate that not all criminology takes this form, but
the dominance of this version of criminology privileges some knowledge forms and ren-
ders others less visible. We can see the presence of this version of criminology in the
implicatory denial of the need to understand the situated life experiences and biographies
of those driven towards violent extremism and to situate those lives with their macro
setting.
In our efforts to appreciate the lives of the three men who were motivated towards such
extremism in Paris in January, we have sought to make sense of their lives and experiences
within the cultural specificity of France and, in so doing, have drawn on material outwith
criminology, its claims as a rendezvous subject notwithstanding. This reflects the splintered
knowledges referred to in the title of this paper. Echoing both Bell (1979) and Young
(2011) our approach refutes single dimensional analyses of what is a complex social and
global problem. As Bell (1979) notes, in attempting to understand the cultural contradic-
tions of capitalism: ‘religion is the fulcrum’. He poignantly goes on to suggest that, ‘a
culture (i.e. capitalism) which has become aware of the limits in exploring the mundane
will turn, at some point, to the effort to recover the sacred’ (Bell 1979: xxviii). Given the
contemporary political, policy and social challenges posed by international conflicts and
political and religiously motivated violence—this is an interesting observation indeed and
one that affords a clue as to how a criminological agenda might be better informed to make
sense of such events. It demands more than a loosening of the shackles of ‘abstracted
empiricism’ (Young 2011: 1). It demands revisiting what might constitute criminology’s
theoretical and conceptual agenda.
Conclusion
This article has endeavoured to make criminological sense of the lives of others. This has
admittedly been an endeavour which has taken place at a distance and conducted with
contingent knowledge. Doubtless the ‘characteristics’ of these offenders have been eagerly
inputted into global databases to derive future risk factors and identify those ‘vulnerable’ to
violent extremism. This paper reflects an entirely different and dissonant exercise. We have
sought to utilise sketches of the biographies of the three men who committed the attacks in
Paris in January 2015 as a vehicle for assessing the utility of criminological knowledge
about violent extremism. We have also sought to tease out some of the peculiarities and
specificities of the French context and in so doing have drawn attention to the violences of
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the State. So, amidst the clamour to find new explanations to what are perceived to be new
problems, structure, context and agency remain square and middle. In as much as it has
become popular to explain the attractiveness of violent extremism with reference to the
internet propaganda posted on ‘jihadi websites’ and the persuasive ideational role played by
mysterious mullahs, the problem of violent extremism truly does need appreciating in the
round. It is a phenomenon with micro, meso and macro features (Schmid 2013). So, any
understanding must include the ‘old’ factors that we know go in the mix when explaining
violent crime. However, given the nature of violent extremism, those ‘old’ factors must also
include the role of the state both domestically and internationally. Thus, there remains a
need to broaden out the criminological focus on moral violations from violent crimes of
individuals to the systemic violence perpetrated by States and corporations through reckless
military forays and negligent practices. Elsewhere it has been argued that in order for
criminology to avoid becoming a ‘zombie discipline’ it is time to reflect on a re-orientation
of its focus so that economic power relations and embedded cultural factors become much
more central to the pre-occupations of the discipline (see Walklate and Mythen 2015). Such
a shift in priorities would require an embrace of ambiguous and messy situations and
processes that do not have visible or concrete ‘solutions’ and that we appreciate our
responsibilities and role in the production of knowledge about those processes.
Of course, some continuities remain. It is no coincidence that old fashioned ‘police
property’ (Lee 1981) invariably includes the young, the unemployed and those from ethnic
minority groups alongside the undisputable evidence that the work of the state on ethnic
minorities in France and elsewhere needs to be in any framework of analysis. Indeed:
There is a symmetrical relationship between those least likely to be pre-occupied
with the liquid anxieties of the age—since their pre-occupations have always been
with work, food and shelter—and those most likely to be the targets of institutional
pre-occupations, since they constitute the other, the wasted, those to be feared
(Walklate and Mythen 2015: 183).
In this respect, there is some similarity here between this analysis and that offered by
Hallsworth and Lea (2011). However, the processes underpinning this symmetrical and
symbiotic relationship are, as Wacquant (2009) suggests, doubly political. They are a
product of institutional actors and rest on a presumption that ‘we have a life in common’.
The problem is that liberal democracy, and its contemporary iteration in the form of neo-
liberalism, denies us a life in common. Hence, for some the search for the existential
(religion) constitutes what, in Bauman’s (2006) terms, may constitute their biographical
solution to systemic problems. Criminology does have the capacity to speak out on these
issues. Its silence, post the events in France throughout 2015, speaks in a fundamental way
about its current neglect of the issues with which this paper has been concerned. In this
silence the profundity of criminology’s liberal bias is to be found. In the absence of
challenging this bias, the discipline is constrained by splintered knowledges and its
capacity to truly understand fractured lives remains impaired.
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